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Abstract
Using a rich dataset from West Africa we study the determinants of membership in
rural producer organizations (RPO). We nd that on average it is the more fortunate
members of rural society who belong in RPOs. In Senegal, the dominant criteria are
land ownership. In Burkina Faso it is economic status and family ties with village au-
thorities. Ethnicity also plays a role: RPO membership is less likely for ethnic groups
that traditionally emphasize livestock raising. We also look for evidence of assortative
matching along multiple dimensions. To this e¤ect we develop an original methodol-
ogy based on dyadic regressions. We nd robust evidence of assortative matching by
physical and ethnic proximity as well as by wealth and social status.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a renewed policy interest in community-based development
(Mansuri and Rao 2004). This interest is predicated on the premise that community-based
interventions can deliver more e¤ective and equitable development.
In practice, community-based interventions in rural areas are often channeled through
rural producer organizations (RPOs). Whether e¤ective and equitable development can be
achieved by assisting RPOs ultimately depends on their composition. If RPOs are composed
primarily of local elites, interventions channelled through them are likely to reect the prefer-
ences and interests of these elites.1 Similarly, if RPOs form along gender or ethnic lines, their
mode of operation is likely to reect the interests of specic gender or ethnic groups. Know-
ing RPOscomposition is thus of interest to policy makers. Yet surprisingly little rigorous
analysis has been devoted to this topic.2
This paper provides elements of answer using two large household surveys in Senegal and
Burkina Faso, West Africa. There is a high prevalence of RPOs in both countries, with most
villages having at least one and many villages having several. We examine the determinants
of RPO membership. We proceed in two steps. First we investigate the factors that make
certain types of households more likely to belong to an RPO. We also examine whether male
and female membership in RPOs is a¤ected by di¤erent determinants. This part of the
analysis follows a standard regression approach in which households are the unit of analysis.
We nd that large, socially integrated households with a lot of land and a young head are
more likely to belong to an RPO. Ethnicity also appears to play an important role: RPO
membership is less likely for ethnic groups that traditionally emphasize livestock raising.
We then examine the data for evidence of assortative matching along multiple dimensions.
This kind of study has traditionally been hindered by the fact that assortative criteria are
often correlated. This makes inference di¢ cult. To see why, suppose we nd that members of
the same RPO share a similar wealth level and a similar ethnicity. If ethnicity and wealth are
correlated, univariate correlation analysis does not enable the researcher to decide whether
1A related issue is the purported problem of elite capture (Platteau and Gaspart 2003).
2There is a growing literature on factors inuencing decision-making at the local level (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2006b), (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006a), (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005), (Besley, Pande,
Rahman, and Rao 2004), (Besley and Coate 2003). But this literature focuses primarily on formal local
institutions, for instance in Asia. No such analysis appears to have been conducted in Africa.
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members of the same association share the same ethnicity because they sort on wealth, or
whether they share the same wealth because they sort on ethnicity. What we need is a way
to conduct multivariate analysis on assortative matching.
To this e¤ect, we develop an original methodology that relies on dyadic regressions.3 We
construct the set of all possible pairs of households in each of the surveyed villages and in-
vestigate whether two households are more likely to belong to the same association if they
resemble each other along various dimensions. Household and village characteristics are in-
cluded as controls. Consistent robust inference is achieved by extending to dyadic regressions
the White-Newey-West-Conley method of correcting standard errors. Unlike existing meth-
ods that rely on bootstrapping, this approach is easy to implement and capable of handling
large datasets without excessive increase in computing time.4
Dyadic regression results by and large conrm the ndings of the rst batch of regressions:
members of RPOs tend to be larger households with more land. They are also less likely to
be headed by a woman. In Burkina we also nd that households with more liquid wealth,
close family ties with the village leadership, and a high self-assessed economic status are
signicantly more likely to belong to an RPO. These results suggest that, on average, RPOs
are elitist organizations, particularly in Burkina.
We also nd that, in both countries, households are more likely to belong to associations
to which households residing nearby also belong, and with members of the same ethnic group.
Geographical and social proximity thus seem to play important roles in the way RPOs are
formed. We also nd evidence of assortative matching on the size of the household and
the gender of the household head. This means that large households tend to be found in
organizations with large households and vice versa and that female-headed households
are more likely to belong to organizations that include other female-headed households.
We nd strong evidence of assortative matching by economic status: the rich and powerful
are found in organizations with other rich and powerful households, and vice versa. The
relevant dimensions of economic status vary somewhat between the two countries, however.
In both countries the data provide evidence of sorting according to livestock ownership. The
3An estimating equation is said to be dyadic if each observation corresponds to a pair of individuals.
Dyadic regressions are increasingly being used by sociologists and economists to study network formation
(e.g. Snijders and Borgatti 1999, Sacerdote 2000, Fafchamps and Gubert 2006).
4A generalized least-square method has also been proposed to estimate dyadic models. The problem with
this method is that, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, it yields inconsistent estimates.
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strongest results are for sheep and goats which constitute the most common form of liquid
wealth in the Sahel (e.g. Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998, Kazianga and Udry 2004). In
Senegal, households are found to sort according to land ownership and education. Since many
RPOs seek to assist agricultural production and market participation, the Senegal ndings
are not entirely surprising: households who join the same RPO tend to have similar land
endowments and capacity to understand market incentives.
In contrast, we nd that Burkinabe households sort on subjective economic status, social
embeddedness, and age, with each variable playing an independent and signicant role in
assortative matching. What this means is that elders with close ties to the village chief and
a high economic status in the village are found in organizations with others like them, while
poorer, younger, less well-connected households are found in other organizations.
These results suggest that RPOs are elitist especially so in Burkina Faso. We therefore
suspect that they play a role in the reproduction of economic stratication. If external actors
wish to achieve their stated goal of social justice, they must pay attention to the social and
economic composition of the RPOs they assist. We have seen that membership in RPOs
is less likely for households that have less land, status, connections, and liquid wealth, are
headed by women, are located at the village periphery, and have an ethnicity di¤erent from
the rest of the village. Channeling development assistance through RPOs may thus fail to
reach the poorest of the poor, unless targeting is put in place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by providing
a context for our study by giving a brief description of rural producer organizations in the
two studied countries. The testing strategy is discussed in detail in Section 3. We focus
on the econometric issues involved in estimating the probability of two households matching
by joining the same RPO. We show that the standard errors obtained by applying standard
estimators to paired data are potentially grossly underestimated, and we derive a simple
standard error correction that accounts for non-independence. The data are presented in
Section 4, together with a description of the general characteristics of the studied households.
In Section 5 we consider the determinants of RPOmembership at the household level. Dyadic
regression results are discussed in detail in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The context
Rural producer organizations (RPOs) are a neglected topic in development economics. In
light of the facts on the ground, this lack of interest is surprising because RPOs are very
common. In Senegal, for example, 68% of the households that we surveyed in 2002 had a
head or a spouse who belonged to at least one RPO, referred to as groupement, in French,
by the peasants themselves.5 In Burkina Faso, where we carried out a similar survey, the
corresponding gure is even higher. RPOs are therefore far from being a minor phenomenon.
On the contrary, they are often a focal point of village life.
RPOs have been in existence for a long time and there is some evidence that they are
becoming increasingly common. In Senegal, there is a long tradition of RPO activity going
back to the pre-independence period (see Ba, Ndiaye, and Sonko (2002) or Faye and Ndiaye
(1998) for good summaries). Numerous national confederations of RPOs operate under
the umbrella of the Conseil National de Concertation et Coopération des Ruraux (CNCR).
They carry considerable political clout that various governments have sometimes chosen to
neglect, usually at their own expense. Their pervasive presence at the grass-roots level, the
broad range of the activities that they touch upon, their historical depth and their political
importance on the national stage imply that RPOs are perhaps, apart from the extended
family, the most important social structure in rural Senegal.
In contrast to Senegal, the Burkinabe peasant movement is a relatively recent develop-
ment, spurred on in part by the terrible drought of 1973, and especially by the progressive
withdrawal of the state from rural areas in the early 2000s. Regional and national feder-
ations are less powerful than their Senegalese counterparts, with the possible exceptions of
the Naam movement and the e¢ cient lières (marketing networks) associated with relatively
successful export crops such as cotton and string beans. Though the state has recently cre-
ated regional Chambres dAgriculture, these structures have not been appropriated by the
peasants themselves, as they have been in Senegal.
5The operational denition of an RPO adopted here corresponds very closely to the term groupement used
by the villagers. Essentially, an RPO is an organization created by producers in order to render services
to the members of the group (although many RPOs also carry out activities, such as village cleanups, that
benet everyone). The group being an association of members is the key feature here, and it implies that
traditional African mutual aid societies such as tontines (ROSCAs) are not RPOs, according to our denition.
Tontines would be better classied under a service NGO heading. On the other hand, a groupement may
set up a tontine as part of its operations.
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Arcand (2004) and DeJanvry and Sadoulet (2004) have classied RPO activities into ve
broad classes: (i) furnishing assistance to income-generating activities (the main ones being
petty commerce, irrigated agriculture and the production of garden vegetables), (ii) man-
aging common property resources (forests, grazing land, water, sh stocks), (iii) providing
social cohesion, redistribution or insurance (examples include cereal banks, collective elds,
tontines), (iv) helping with training and information dissemination, and (v) engaging in ex-
ternal representation (within local development committees or higher level confederations
of RPOs). RPOs are involved in most of the rare agricultural export success stories that
Senegal and Burkina Faso have to o¤er, such as cherry tomatoes and string beans.
There are at least two compelling reasons for studying the matching process that leads to
RPO formation. First, there is a widespread belief among many development practitioners
that RPOs match the poor with the poor while the matching of the rich with the rich is
believed to take place outside of the RPO sphere. If true, this would over time generate a
potentially explosive polarization of rural societies into two distinct socioeconomic classes.
According to this view, RPOs may provide services to their members, but these members are
often thought to have no viable alternative. RPOs are thus seen as safety nets constructed
by the poor for themselves, but which do not have access to the assets of the richer elements
of the population. Moreover, when relatively rich or socially prestigious individuals partic-
ipate in RPO activities, their actions are largely interpreted as being driven by predatory
designs. Assessing whether this is indeed the case is therefore of some interest in terms of
the distributional impact of fostering RPOs.
Second, it is of general interest in the West African context to study whether traditional
norms such as ethnicity and caste remain important in terms of social interaction, or whether
they have been (or are being) replaced by more narrowly focused economic concerns. In
some sense, identifying those factors that lead to households matching under the aegis of
RPOs is a manner of weighting the extent to which homo economicus has supplanted homo
traditionalis.
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3 Testing strategy
We wish to identify the factors associated with RPO membership. In particular, we are in-
terested in testing whether members in a given RPO di¤er systematically from non-members
in terms of wealth, status, ethnicity, and geographical proximity. We also want to investigate
assortative matching. We have data on household membership in RPOs and information on
a vector of variables x e.g., ethnicity, wealth, status that can potentially explain why two
randomly selected households i and j are in the same RPO. Households that are closerin
some relevant metric are expected to be more likely to join the same RPO. Our problem is
to identify which of these dimensions matters, given that proximity measures are typically
correlated with each other.
3.1 Membership regression
We begin by estimating a regression of the form:
Pr(miv = 1) = (xiv + uiv) (1)
where miv = 1 if household i in village v belongs to an RPO, and miv = 0 otherwise, and (:)
is the logit function. The vector of regressors xiv includes various characteristics of household
i potentially associated with membership in producer organizations.
Estimation of regression (1) can tell us whether household characteristics xiv di¤er sys-
tematically between RPO members and non-members. For instance, it can tell us whether
RPO members are systematically wealthier than non-members, or whether members of a
specic ethnic group are more likely to belong to RPOs. To the extent that household char-
acteristics are correlated with each other, a multivariate regression such as (1) allows us
to distinguish the factors that drive RPO membership from those that are correlated with
membership only because they are correlated with driving factors. For instance, it can tell us
whether the observed relationship between ethnicity and RPO membership disappears once
we control for wealth, economic status, or social embeddedness.
For regression (1) to be meaningful, we must adequately control for household size. The
reason is that each (adult) household member can, in principle, joint an RPO. The likelihood
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that at least one member of a household belong to an RPO therefore increases with household
size. The question then arises of what functional form to select.
To work this out, let p be the probability that an individual belongs to an RPO. If
membership is independent across individuals in the same household the probability that at
least one household member belongs to an RPO is 1   (1   p)N , where N is the size of the
household. In contrast, if membership is perfectly correlated across household members, Pr(at
least one member) = p. Generalizing from the above, the probability can be approximated
as
Pr(at least one member)  1  (1  p)N (2)
where   1 measures the extent to which outcomes are correlated within households. If
we let p = e
x
1+ex
, can we nd a way of writing a logit regression model that approximates
(2)? Numerical experimentation reveals that, for values of N in the relevant range, a rough
approximation can be found as:
1 

1  e
x
1 + ex
N
 e
x+ log(N)
1 + ex+ log(N)
This means that adding log(N) in regression (1) is an e¤ective of controlling for household
size.
We also need a way of controlling for village size and for the number of RPOs in the
village. Suppose there are M RPOs in the village, all equivalent. If all villagers are free
to join any group, the number of groups M and the number of individuals in the village V
should not matter. Now suppose that, for whatever reason, there is a constraint on group
size. Joining a group is thus more di¢ cult when M=V is small.
To illustrate this possibility, suppose that, among those who wish to join an RPO, only
a proportion M=V gets to join; the others are rationed out. We have Pr(member) = pM
V
.
Letting Pr(member) = e
a
1+ea
, we get:
a = log
pM
V
1  pM
V
 log p+ log  + log(M=V ) + pM=V +O2
Given that M=V is typicaly a very small number, variation in a is driven primarily by
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log(M=V ). Hence adding a term in log(M=V ) in (1) controls for limits on group size. If this
term has a positive coe¢ cient, group size is constraining.
If RPO membership is correlated within households, the average household size V=H
matters as well, with H the number of households in the village. If correlation is perfect
and group size is constraining, household membership only depends on log(M=H), not on
log(M=V ). If correlation is imperfect, both matter. Imperfect correlation in RPO member-
ship within households can thus be captured by including log(M=V ) and log(V=H) in (1).
If membership is independent within households, the coe¢ cient of log(V=H) = 0. In con-
trast, if membership is perfectly correlated within households, membership depends only on
log(M=H), which implies that the coe¢ cient of log(M=V ) and log(V=H) should be equal.6
This can easily be tested.
Finally, we wish to allow for the possibility that RPOs are dedicated to a specic interest
group or activity. The probability that an individual nds a group catering to his or her
special interest therefore increases with the absolute number of groups in the village. To
capture this possibility, we include logM as a separate regressor. If the coe¢ cient of logM
is positive, this suggests that group diversity matters.
3.2 Dyadic regression
Although regression (1) is useful, it falls short of our objective on two counts. First it cannot
tell us whether geographical proximity matters: the distance between households is a relative
concept, not an individual characteristic, and hence its e¤ect cannot be studied using model
(1).7 Secondly, it can only identify certain types of assortative matching. To see why, consider
a relevant household characteristic, such as wealth. Regression (1) enables us to test whether
6We need to show that:
 log(M=H) =  log(M=V ) +  log(V=H)
We have:
 log(M=V ) +  log(V=H) =  logM    log V +  log(V )   log(H)
=  logM    logH
=  log(M=H)
7Using (1) it would be possible to study whether households located, say, to the South of the village are
systematically more likely to belong to an RPO. But this is di¤erent from ascertaining whether members of
the same RPO tend to originate from the same part of the village, irrespective of whether this part is in the
South or the North of the village.
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RPO members are systematically wealthier than non-members. But it cannot test whether,
in some villages, RPOs are made up of wealthy households while in others they are made up
of poor households or of average households.
This is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, RPO members and non-members di¤er
systematically in the absolute level of the relevant household characteristic say wealth. In
Figure 2, RPO members are more alike in terms of wealth than non-members, with both rich
and poor outside the organization. We could imagine yet another situation the reverse of
Figure 1 where the poor are in the RPO and the rich are not. We want to test whether
RPOs tend to contain households that are more similar than non-members in some important
dimensions. In case there are multiple organizations in a given village, we also want to test
whether the rich and poor join di¤erent RPOs, something that regression (1) cannot do.
To solve this inference problem, we apply dyadic regression methods developed for network
analysis. Association membership can be represented as a graph in which each household is
a node and a link between two nodes i and j exists if i and j belong to the same RPO. The
set of all links in village v can be summarized as an N N matrix Mv = [mijv ] where N is
the number of households in village v, and mijv = 1 when households i and j belong to the
same RPO, and mijv = 0 otherwise.8
We estimate a dyadic regression of the form
Pr(mijv = 1) = (xijv + uijv) (3)
where (:) is the logit function. As discussed in Fafchamps and Gubert (2006), the estimation
of regressions of this form raises two types of di¢ culties: identication and inference. The
rst problem relates to the form in which regressors xijv enter the regression. The second
relates to the estimation of standard errors. We discuss these in turn.
Regressors include two types of variables: attributes wij of the link between i and j, such
as the geographical distance between i and j; and attributes zi and zj of households i and j.
Regressors must enter a dyadic regression in a symmetric fashion so that the e¤ect of (zi; zj)
on mij is the same as the e¤ect of (zj; zi) on mji. Dyadic regressors must therefore be written
8In practice, we drop the N ii pairs on the diagonal since, by denition, a household is in the same RPO
as itself.
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in a way that preserves this symmetry.
In our case, the dyadic relationship is non-directional since, by construction, mjiv = mijv
for all i; j. Symmetry therefore requires that regressors satisfy xijv = xjiv. One easy way
of satisfying this requirement is to specify:
xijv  0 + 1jziv   zjvj+ 2(ziv + zjv) + 3jwijvj+ uijv (4)
where zi and zj are characteristics of individual i and j thought to inuence the likelihood
of a link mijv between them.
The interpretation of equation (4) is straightforward: 1 measures the e¤ect of di¤erences
in attributes on mijv while 2 captures the e¤ect of the combined level of ziv and zjv on mijv.
For instance, suppose that z represents wealth. A positive 2 implies that RPO members are
systematically wealthier than non-members; its interpretation is thus similar to the wealth
coe¢ cient in equation (1). In contrast, a negative 1 means that households that di¤er a
lot in their wealth level are unlikely to belong to the same organization. In other words, a
positive 2 means that RPOs are made primarily of wealthy households, while a negative 1
means that members of the same RPO tend to have similar wealth levels, i.e., the rich team
up with the rich and the poor with the poor. The same formalism can be applied to the case
where ziv is a dummy variable.9
Through wijv, equation (4) allows the identication of pure relative e¤ects, such as the
geographical distance between households i and j. It also allows for purely relative measures
of social distance. For instance, we can include in wijv a dummy variable that equals 1 if
i and j belong to the same ethnic group, and 0 otherwise. This enables us to test whether
households sort by ethnicity when they join RPOs.
Observations in equation (4) are not independent. This is due to the presence of individual-
specic factors common to all observations involving that individual. It follows thatE[uij; uik] 6=
0 for all k and E[uij; ukj] 6= 0 for all k. By the same reasoning, we also have E[uij; ujk] 6= 0
and E[uij; uki] 6= 0.10 Provided that regressors are exogenous, applying OLS to a dyadic
9For dichotomous regressors, there are typically several equivalent ways of incorporating them in the
regression. The formalism of equation (4) o¤ers the advantage of consistency of notation and allows for easy
interpretation.
10This situation bears some formal resemblance to random e¤ects models with two-way error components
discussed for instance by Baltagi (1995), except that here we have four-way random e¤ects.
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regression yields consistent coe¢ cient estimates but standard errors are inconsistent, leading
to incorrect inference.
Robust standard errors must correct for cross-observation correlation in the error terms
involving similar individuals. To obtain such robust standard errors, we extend the method
that Conley (1999) developed to deal with spatial correlation of errors. Conleys method
is itself an extension of the robust covariance matrix popularized by White and applied to
time series by Newey and West. In the case of OLS, the formula for the network-corrected
covariance matrix is of the form (Fafchamps and Gubert 2006):11
AV ar(b) = 1
N  K (X
0X) 1
 
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
NX
k=1
NX
l=1
mijkl
2N
Xijuiju
0
klXkl
!
(X 0X) 1 (5)
where  denotes the vector of coe¢ cients, N is the number of dyadic observations, K is the
number of regressors, X is the matrix of all regressors, Xij is the vector of regressors for
dyadic observation ij, and mijkl = 1 if i = k; j = l; i = l or j = k, and 0 otherwise.12 The
only structure imposed on the covariance structure is that E[uij; ukm] = 0.13 Formula (5)
also corrects for possible heteroskedasticity. Estimation results reported in Section 6 show
that, in our data, uncorrected standard-errors are dramatically underestimated, often by at
least one order of magnitude.
Other forms of non-independence may also be present in the data. One particular source
of concern is the possibility of correlated errors within villages. To correct for this possibility,
we also report robust standard errors that allow for village clustering of errors. It is easy to
see that correcting for village clustering also corrects for dyadic non-independence, since the
11Other methods have been devised to conduct inference on network data. One such method relies on
permutation methods popularized by Good (2000). This method was rst applied to network analysis by
Hubert and Schultz (1976) and subsequently rened by Krackhardt (1987) and Nyblom, Borgatti, Roslakka
and Salo (2003). Instead of correcting standard errors, permutation methods correct p-values directly. This
procedure is known as Quadratic Assignment Procedure or QAP in the literature (Hubert and Schultz 1976).
This approach has gained much popularity among sociologists who typically compute QAP p-values using
a linear probability model. We believe our method to be statistically more e¢ cient since it does not rely
on bootstrapping. The rst version of this paper used QAP to derive p-values. Inference was similar to
using dyadic standard errors. A GLS estimator for dyadic data called P2 has also been developed by
sociologists (Dekker, Krackhardt and Snijders 2003). This method is sensitive to heteroskedasticity, which is
why we prefer to keep OLS and logit estimates and correct standard errors directly (Wooldridge 2002).
12By construction, all observations where j = i or k = l are identically zero and hence are omitted. Division
of the inner term by 2 corrects for the double counting implied by the simple way we have written the formula.
13Computation of (5) as written is very computer-intensive. It is however possible to take advantage of
specic Stata commands and of the structure of the mijkls to reduce computation to a small number of
matrix manipulations. To apply formula (5) to logit, (X 0X) 1 needs to be replaced by an expression that
depends on the scores.
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village clustering correction includes the inner sum in (5).
4 The data
The data stem from a large scale survey of 250 villages in Senegal and 268 villages in Burkina
Faso. The surveys were undertaken in 2002 under the auspices of the World Bank. In Sene-
gal, the survey was organized in tight collaboration with an organ of the principal national
peasant organization, the Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotion des Petits Projets de
Développement à la Base (ASPRODEB). In Burkina Faso, where no such strong national
federation exists, the survey was organized in the context of the Projet National de Développe-
ment des Services Agricoles (PNDSA II), funded by the World Bank.
For the purpose of the surveys, a rural producer organization or RPO is dened as an
organization created by producers to provide services to its members.14 In practice, this
denition corresponds very closely to the term groupement used by villagers.15
In each village, an informant was hired who, under the supervision of village inhabi-
tants, carried out a census of all households, for whom he collected information on socio-
demographic variables and on their participation in village RPOs.16 Separate questionnaires
cover village infrastructure and RPO activities. Details on the surveys, carried out almost
contemporaneously in Senegal and Burkina Faso, can be found in Arcand (2004) and DeJan-
vry and Sadoulet (2004).
The Senegal survey covers three geographical areas (the Senegal river basin, the so-called
"peanut basin", and the area known as the Niayes), selected to get as broad a coverage as pos-
sible of RPO activities. The survey design involves stratied sampling, with 19 sub-regional
clusters (corresponding to a Senegalese administrative district known as a communauté ru-
rale), and 250 villages.
The Bukina Faso survey covers three broad regions: (i) the cotton region (mainly Co-
14Many RPOs carry out activities, such as village cleanups, that benet everyone. But that is not their
primary purpose.
15This denition implies that traditional African mutual aid societies such as tontines (ROSCAs) are not
regarded as RPOs, even though a groupement may set up a tontine as part of its activities.
16The denition of a household used here and in most surveys in Senegal is the following: a household is
a group of individuals whose meals are organized by one person (the household head). A "household" is
therefore a "cooking unit". In most cases, the members of a household that is dened in this manner live
within the same concession or carré. All of the questionnaires used in the surveys, as well as a number of
the reports cited earlier, are available at http://www.cerdi.org/P_Perso/PP_Home.asp?IDUSER=arcand
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moë, Tapoa and Nahouri) where living standards are usually higher than in the rest of the
country and RPOs are often due to intervention by Sotex (the national cotton marketing
corporation); (ii) the central Mossi plateau, which is quite arid and where traditional norms
are likely to be predominant; and (iii) the Oudalan region, which is ecologically a near-desert,
where livestock constitutes the main activity, and where the Peuhls, Tamacheks and Bella
ethnic groups are predominant. As in Senegal, the Burkina Faso survey involved stratied
sampling, with 22 clusters at the département level, with approximately 14 randomly-drawn
villages per cluster, yielding a total of 289 villages. A little over 20,000 households were
interviewed in the two countries 12,212 in Burkina Faso and 8,415 in Senegal.
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the Senegal and Burkina Faso household
surveys. The average rural household in our sample comprises 7.5 members in Burkina and
close to 10 in Senegal. A small proportion of them are headed by women. The education
level of surveyed household heads is very low, and many of them are illiterate. Surveyed
households own on average around 3 hectares (7.5 acres) of land and a number of farm
animals mostly goats and sheep.
Asked to rank their economic status on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 4 (rich), respondents
in both countries gave themselves an average ranking of 2=poor. Respondents were also
asked whether they have family ties to various village authorities, such as the village chief, a
religious leader, a marabout, or some other traditional authority gure. On the basis of their
answers we constructed a social embeddedness index that takes values from 0 (no family ties
to any village authority) to 4 (family ties to four di¤erent categories of village authorities).
The average value of the index is 1, meaning that most respondents have family ties with
some of the village authorities.
Membership in RPOs is detailed next. Information on membership is reported at the
individual level. The rst line reports the proportion of surveyed households in which at
least one member belongs to an RPO. This represents over half of the surveyed households in
Burkina Faso and nearly three quarters of them in Senegal. Next we report the proportion of
surveyed households in which at least one male member belongs to an RPO. We see that two-
fths to one half of surveyed households fall into this category. We also report the percentage
of households in which at least one female member belongs to an RPO. The gures di¤er
13
between Burkina where less than a third of surveyed households fall into this category 
and Senegal where two thirds of households are in this category.
The ethnic make-up of the surveyed villages is described next. In both countries we
observe a lot of diversity, with no ethnic group accounting for more than one third of the
sample. Within villages, however, ethnic diversity is less pronounced. In this region of West
Africa, the Peuhl or Fulani and the Touareg or Tamacheks traditionally emphasize
livestock raising. The Peuhl are found in both survey countries.
Table 2 reports some relevant characteristics of the surveyed villages. We see that the
number of households in each village turns around 100 to 200, with quite a bit of variation
across villages. The average number of inhabitants is around 1000. Using data on ethnic com-
position from the village questionnaire, we computed the ethnic fractionalization index for
each village.17 The index takes values from 0 (perfect homogeneity) to 1 (extreme fragmen-
tation). Results show that villages in Senegal are on average more ethnically homogeneous
than in Burkina. Both countries nevertheless exhibit quite a bit of ethnic heterogeneity at
the village level.
The two surveyed areas are characterized by an abundance of RPOs. In Burkina Faso,
each surveyed village has an average of 3.2 RPOs. In Senegal the average is slightly lower, at
2.4. Perhaps because of their poverty, surveyed villages are frequently the target of govern-
mental, bilateral donor or NGO activity, with almost 60% of surveyed villages having some
form of external partnership.
We also report village characteristics that may be important determinants of the returns
to joining a producer organization. Wells can be used for horticulture, and we see that
villages di¤er in terms of the number of wells they have. Electricity can be used to power
irrigation pumps. The data show that very few Burkinabe villages have electric power, but up
to one fth of surveyed Senegalese villages do. The sale of agricultural surplus is facilitated
if producers have easy access to a market outlet. The data show that only a quarter of all
surveyed villages have a village market. Production for the market is hindered in villages
that, during the rainy season, are isolated from the rest of the country by impassable roads.
The data show that surveyed villages vary along this dimension as well.
Table 3 breaks down households between RPO members and non-members and reports
17This is basically a Herndhal index.
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t-tests for all variables. Villages with no RPO are dropped so as to only compare house-
holds with access to RPO membership. We have taken the log of variables with a skewed
distribution (i.e., household size and wealth) so as to avoid test results driven by outliers.
Results show that, on average, RPO members unambiguously come from larger, wealthier
households. They have closer family ties with village authorities and are less likely to be
headed by a woman. This is true in both countries and the di¤erence is highly signicant,
albeit not always large in magnitude.
We also note some di¤erences in RPO membership across ethnic groups. In Senegal, over
95% of the Toucouleur belong to RPOs compared to 85% for the average household.18 We
also nd that the Peuhl and Serere are less likely to belong to an RPO. Similar di¤erence
are found in Burkina Faso, where the Peuhl, Bissa and Gourmatche are less likely to belong
in RPOs. Because of the emphasis many Peuhl put on livestock raising, they tend to live
outside the village so as to facilitate access to pasture and minimize crop destruction. Their
culture is also much more individualistic and less centered on the overall community than is
that other ethnic groups. These factors may explain why they are under-represented among
RPO members.
Turning to di¤erences in village characteristics, we see that the average RPO member
tends to come from villages with fewer households and inhabitants. But while Burkinabe
RPO members tend to live in villages with more RPOs, the opposite holds in Senegal. As
we have argued in Section 2, more relevant comparisons are in terms of log(M=H) and
log(V=H). The Table shows that, as expected, RPO members tend to live in villages where
average household size V=H is larger and where the density M=H of RPOs per inhabitant is
higher.
The relationship between other village characteristics and RPO membership varies be-
tween the two countries with no identiable pattern. For instance, in Burkina Faso, RPO
members tend to live in villages that are less ethnically homogeneous and more easily acces-
sible in the rainy season; but the opposite holds in Senegal. To clarify the respective roles of
these various factors we need a multivariate analysis, to which we now turn.
18Living in a village with at least one RPO.
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5 The determinants of RPO membership
We begin by estimating membership regression (1). We wish to investigate whether RPO
membership represents all sectors of rural society or whether wealthier and better connected
households are more likely to belong to an RPO. Our main objective is thus to test whether
various components of wealth and social status are associated with RPO membership. As ex-
plained in Section 2, we control for household size logN , number of RPOs/villager log(M=H),
average household size log(V=H), and group diversity logM .
Results are presented in Tables 4A and 4B. Three sets of regression results are presented.
In the rst column, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if any member of the household
belongs to an RPO. In the second column, the dependent variable is 1 if any male member
of the household belongs to an RPO. The third column is the same as column two, but for
female membership. The estimator is logit. Robust standard errors corrected for village
clustering are reported in all cases.
We begin by noting that, in ve of the six regressions, household size is signicant with
the anticipated sign: larger households are more likely to belong to an RPO. This indicates
that membership is not perfectly correlated among household members. We also nd that
in all regressions the likelihood of membership increases in log(M=H) signicantly so in
four out of six regressions. This suggests that there are constraints to group size: larger
villages need more groups to maintain the same (conditional) probability of membership.
Average household size is also signicant and positive in three regressions, suggesting that
membership is correlated across household members. In none of the six regressions can we
reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of log(M=H) and log(V=H) are equal, suggesting
perfect correlation in membership within households. Individual coe¢ cients are not estimated
very precisely, however, so that the evidence of perfect correlation is not strong we could
probably equally fail to reject that it is 0.8 or any other large number less than 1. Since the
coe¢ cient associated with household size logN is itself signicant, the lesson we draw is that
there is a strong but imperfect correlation in membership across household members.
Turning to household characteristics, we nd a signicant positive association between
wealth or status and RPO membership, albeit with some variation across regressions and
countries. Land ownership is signicant in four out of six regressions and self-assessed eco-
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nomic status in two (both in Burkina). Family ties with village authorities are highly signif-
icant in the three Burkina regression but in none of the Senegal regressions. This suggests
that social embeddedness is a more important determinant of RPO membership in Burkina
Faso than in Senegal.
We also nd that young household heads are more likely to belong to an RPO. In Burkina,
female headed households are less likely to belong, but in Senegal the e¤ect is ambiguous.
Once we control for land and status, livestock ownership does not appear to retain any
signicant systematic association with RPO membership. In contrast, controlling for wealth
di¤erences does not eliminate the role of ethnicity, suggesting that di¤erences in ethnicity
play a role in RPO membership that is distinct from that of wealth and status. In both
countries the Peuhl are less likely to belong to an RPO, a nding that conrms our earlier
observation.
In Senegal, all village characteristics except one are insignicant. In Burkina Faso we
nd that RPO membership is associated with more wells, less electricity, and more ethnic
fractionalization. The fact that these results are not robust suggests that village heterogeneity
is perhaps not adequately controlled for by village characteristics.
To correct for this, we reestimate equation (1) with village xed-e¤ects. We also continue
to correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity and village clustering. Results are presented
in Tables 5A and 5B. Results are in general stronger, conrming that village heterogeneity
is at issue. We now nd that land ownership is signicant in all regressions and that family
ties with village authorities are signicant in ve out of six regressions. The magnitude of
the coe¢ cient remains stronger in Burkina Faso, however. The ownership of goats and sheep
which constitute the most liquid form of wealth in the study areas  is now positively
associated with RPO membership in all six regressions.
Results also conrm that the relationship between ethnicity and RPO membership cannot
be fully explained either by wealth e¤ects which are captured explicitly in the regression 
or by di¤erences in ethnic composition across villages which are captured by village xed
e¤ects. There is a systematic association between ethnicity and RPO membership within
villages. Whether this is due to discrimination or self-selection is unclear. In Burkina Faso,
the two groups that are negatively a¤ected the Peuhl and the Touareg are traditionally
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specialized in livestock raising. In that case, di¤erences in professional focus may explain
di¤erences in RPO membership across ethnic groups.
6 The determinants of RPO matching
The empirical analysis we have conducted so far tells us that RPO members di¤er system-
atically from non-members. But it does not tell us whether members of the same RPO are
more alike than non-members. To do this, we now turn to the dyadic methods described
earlier.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the dyadic variables used in the analysis. The
dependent variablemijv is equal to 1 if households i and j in village v belong to the same RPO,
and 0 otherwise. As before we consider three dependent variables. In the rst one, mijv = 1 if
any member of households i and j belongs to the same RPO. In the second (third),mijv = 1 if
both households have a male (female) member in the same RPO. Summary statistics reported
in the Table show that the proportion of household pairs that belong to the same RPO is
higher in Senegal than in Burkina Faso. This is particularly true for female membership. In
both countries, a non-negligible proportion of household pairs have more than one RPO in
common.
Next we present the regressors used in the analysis. Two distance measures wijv are used
physical distance and a dummy that takes the value one if both household heads belong
to the same ethnic group.19 We see that there is variation in physical distance. In contrast,
most pairs of households share the same ethnicity. This is because villages are more ethnically
homogeneous than the surveyed population as a whole.
Household regressors are divided into two groups: absolute di¤erences and sums. These
correspond to jziv zjvj and (ziv+zjv) in equation (4). Village regressors, which by denition
are identical for two households in the same village, only appear in levels, not in di¤erences.
The reported number of pairs is quite large close to 700,000 observations in Burkina Faso,
half that in Senegal.20
19Physical distance is computed as follows. For each village, a stylized map was constructed that locates
each household in the village on a grid. On this grid are placed the concessions or carrés blocks of households
typically surrounded by a fence  that make up the village. Physical distance between two households is
computed as the euclidian distance between their grid coordinates.
20The number of observations reported here includes both the upper and lower triangles of each matrix
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Tables 7A and 7B present coe¢ cient estimates of dyadic regression (3). Regressors that
control for the sum of household characteristics play basically the same role as household
characteristics in the previous section. Suppose, for instance, that wealth makes households
more likely to belong to an RPO. In that case, a pair of households that are both wealthy
are more likely to belong to an RPO, and thus the coe¢ cient associated with the sum of
household wealth will be positive. Since we control for level e¤ects, a negative coe¢ cient for
a di¤erence variable indicates assortative matching: the more di¤erent two households are,
the less likely they belong to the same RPO.
The regressions presented in Tables 7A and 7B enable us to test assortative matching
versus level e¤ects, associated for example with elitist recruitment. As an illustration, if only
the coe¢ cient associated with the wealth di¤erence variable is signicant, households tend
to belong to RPOs with households of a similar wealth level i.e., the rich with the rich and
the poor with the poor but the wealth level per se does not matter, i.e., households of any
wealth level are equally likely to belong to the same RPO. In contrast, if only the coe¢ cient
associated with the wealth sum variable is signicant, then the wealthy are more likely to be
members. What initially appears to be assortative matching (the rich are with the rich) is
in fact due to level e¤ects, not to matching.
In the Tables we report two sets of standard errors. The rst set is computed using the
dyadic correction formula given in (5). The second set controls for village clustering and thus
allows for any error correlation within villages. In general it leads to more conservative and
possibly ine¢ cient inference, which is why we report both sets of standard errors.
Turning to the results themselves, we begin by noting that geographical and ethnic prox-
imity are very signicant determinants of RPO matching in Burkina Faso, but not in Senegal.
This is consistent with earlier ndings that Burkinabe villages have more RPOs but a smaller
proportion of households in them, suggesting higher RPO fragmentation in Burkina than in
Senegal. What Table 7A adds to this picture is the observation that fragmentation in Burk-
inabe RPOs follows geographical and ethnic lines.
The results indicate assortative matching along many dimensions. Indeed, most di¤erence
Mv. The reason is that the computation of dyadic standard errors is achieved using a method that allows
for directional networks, and hence requires both triangles. Since our network matrices are not directional,
this means that each observation appears twice in the dataset. This does not a¤ect results, however, because
the standard error formula we use corrects for this.
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variables have a negative coe¢ cient. We have already seen that larger households are more
likely to belong to an RPO. This is conrmed here as well see the coe¢ cient of the sum
of household size. Tables 7A and 7B further show that households also tend to match on
household size. This means that, on average, RPO member households tend to be larger than
non-member households. But there are also some RPOs with smaller households grouped
together.
Turning to other households characteristics, across the two countries and the three re-
gressions we nd signicant negative coe¢ cients for several livestock variables, suggesting
matching on liquid wealth. This is true even though the level of livestock wealth is either
generally not signicant (Burkina Faso) or signicant but with conicting signs (Senegal).
As in the results presented in section 5, we nd that Burkinabe RPO members tend to have
more family ties with village authorities: the coe¢ cients associated with the sum variable are
signicant in all three regressions. In addition, we also nd evidence of assortative matching
on family ties, suggesting that there exist some RPOs in which most members have weak
family ties with village authorities.
For age and land ownership, we obtain di¤erent results in the two countries. In Senegal,
there is evidence of assortative matching on land ownership, but of dissimilar matching on
age. The opposite results obtain in Burkina. To interpret these results correctly, we need
to consider the coe¢ cients associated with the sum variables. Regarding land, we nd as
in Section 4 that RPO members in both countries have on average more land than non-
members.21 In Senegal we also nd assortative matching, suggesting that some RPOs are
composed predominantly of land-poor households. In Burkina, in contrast, we nd dissimilar
matching, implying that some households with very little land belong to the same RPO as
land-rich households. This may be the consequence of matching on family ties, which is
much stronger in Burkina. The coe¢ cients associated with village characteristics appear at
the bottom of the two Tables. Findings are by and large similar to those reported in the
preceding section and need not be discussed further.
Tables 7A and 7B control for a number of village characteristics and report standard
errors that are corrected for village clustering. But they may be a¤ected by unobserved
village characteristics that are correlated with regressors. To check whether our results are
21Albeit the result in not signicant for males in Burkina.
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robust to unobserved village heterogeneity, we reestimate all dyadic regressions controlling
for village xed e¤ects. To improve e¢ ciency, we redene the dependent variable as the
number of common RPOs to which both households belong. Values vary between 0 and
3. The estimator is least squares with village xed e¤ects. We again report two sets of
standard errors. The rst set is corrected for dyadic dependence. The second allows for
village correlation of residuals.
Results are presented in Tables 8A and 8B. Results are in general stronger and more
consistent across regressions and countries, suggesting that village heterogeneity is indeed a
problem. We now nd evidence that physical and ethnic proximity matter in both countries,
although the e¤ect is stronger in Burkina. This indicates matching along geographical and
ethnic lines in both countries. Assortative matching in livestock wealth is conrmed. So is
assortative matching on land in Senegal and on family ties with village authorities in Burkina
Faso. We now also nd assortative matching in education in Senegal and in subjective
economic status in Burkina. Finally, female-headed households are more likely to be found
in RPOs with other female-headed households in both countries. These results conrm the
presence not only of wealth and status e¤ects in both countries, but also of assortative
matching according to a variety of wealth and status indicators.
7 Conclusion
We have examined the determinants of membership in rural producer organizations in Burk-
ina Faso and Senegal. We have found evidence that, on average, it is the more fortunate
members of rural society who belong in RPOs. In Senegal, the dominant criterion is land
ownership. In Burkina Faso it is family ties with village authorities and (subjectively as-
sessed) economic status. Ethnicity also plays a role: RPO membership is less likely for
ethnic groups that traditionally emphasize livestock raising.
We looked for evidence of assortative matching along multiple dimensions. To this e¤ect
we developed an original methodology based on dyadic regressions. We found robust evidence
of assortative matching by physical and ethnic proximity as well as by wealth and social
status.
Though our ndings are clear, their interpretation is less so. This is because we do not
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know whether similarity is a cause or a consequence of assortative matching. In other words,
we do not know whether RPO members were richer and more alike than non-RPO members
before they joined the RPO, or whether they became so as a result of direct and indirect
RPO e¤ects.
Given the local context, we suspect that ethnicity, age, land ownership (most of which is
inherited), and family ties with village authorities are largely predetermined. Consequently,
it is unlikely that assortative matching along these dimensions results from reverse causation.
Things are less clear for livestock, which largely stems from individual accumulation. These
important issues are left for future research.
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SenegalBurkina FasoTable 1. Descriptive statistics
St.dev.MeanSt.dev.MeanHousehold characteristics
6.09.85.07.5number of household members
15501644age of head
7.1%2.4%female head dummy
1.40.71.00.3education level of head (in years)
3.62.73.73.1owned land (ha)
4.12.11.20.6nber of horses and donkeys
8.62.910.93.6nber of cattle
13.27.816.77.5nber of goat and sheep
0.92.01.02.1economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
0.90.81.00.9family ties with authorities (index from 0 to 4)
RPO membership
73.8%56.3%% which are member of at least one RPO
41.6%47.2%% with at least one male in RPO
64.7%30.2%% with at least one female in RPO
Ethnicity (Burkina Faso)
31.7%Mossi
18.1%Gourmatche
12.3%Peuhl
7.5%Gourounsi
5.6%Touareg
4.4%Bissa
20.4%Other
Ethnicity (Senegal)
28.0%Wolof
24.3%Peuhl
23.5%Toucouleur
19.0%Serere
5.2%Other
841512212Number of observations
SenegalBurkina FasoTable 2. Village characteristics
St.dev.MeanSt.dev.Mean
178115255190number of households
107093812141309number of inhabitants
0.170.110.240.23ethnic fractionalization index
2.32.43.73.2number of RPOs
78.4%90.7%% with at least one RPO
3.42.58.34.0number of wells
26.8%28.5%market in village
20.9%2.2%electricity in village
64.3%46.6%village accessible in rainy season
250268Number of observations
Table 3. Breakdown of household and village characteristics by members and non-members
SenegalBurkina Faso
mean for:mean for:
t-statallmembersnon-mb.t-statallmembersnon-mb.Household characteristics
-14.982.132.181.89-18.211.831.911.69log(number of household members)
5.950.080.070.125.280.020.020.03female head dummy
-2.6151.0851.2750.02-2.6744.6544.9744.12age of head
1.230.730.720.78-0.150.340.340.33education level of head
-6.080.800.820.64-10.180.860.930.73family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
-9.921.011.050.81-16.631.181.261.04log(owned land +1)
1.670.660.660.70-4.960.330.340.30log(nber of donkeys+1)
-1.000.460.470.44-5.910.790.830.71log(nber of cows+1)
-9.541.311.371.00-8.271.501.581.39log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
-3.411.951.961.86-13.292.092.181.93economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
Village characteristics
1.242.672.652.80-2.494.034.183.76number of wells
7.730.110.100.15-10.660.230.240.19ethnic fractionalization index
1.430.310.300.322.220.290.290.31market in village
7.790.240.220.33-0.570.020.020.02electricity in village
8.050.650.630.76-4.890.480.490.45village accessible in rainy season
3.571271241466.60181169199number of households
4.621029100411734.08133312961395number of inhabitants
2.872.752.712.92-5.193.573.723.34number of RPOs
-6.28-5.75-5.72-5.88-13.73-5.92-5.84-6.06log(# RPOs/# village inhabitants)
-4.762.202.212.15-9.232.152.192.09log(average household size)
3.080.780.770.84-7.370.961.000.89log(number of RPOs in village)
7299620910901101168794132Number of observations
Using only households in villages with at least one RPO
Table 4A. Determinants of RPO membership – Burkina Faso
Female hh membersMale hh membersAny hh member
robustrobustrobust
z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.Household characteristics
5.370.4354.650.3666.650.531log(number of household members)
-2.26-0.597-1.93-0.531-0.67-0.153female head dummy
-0.06-0.000-6.50-0.014-4.16-0.009age of head
-1.45-0.0480.000.000-0.34-0.010education level of head
3.950.2984.010.2664.680.305family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
0.680.0643.300.2744.360.346log(owned land +1)
-1.19-0.1201.010.0950.300.029log(nber of donkeys+1)
0.700.038-0.06-0.003-1.12-0.056log(nber of cows+1)
1.420.0630.140.0060.920.036log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
0.390.0222.590.1422.530.143economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
Ethnicity (Mossi is omitted category)
-1.71-0.554-2.10-0.540-3.09-0.781peuhl
1.540.392-2.48-0.790-0.30-0.080gourounsi
-2.64-1.924-5.35-3.092-4.15-3.105bissa
-3.08-0.843-3.69-0.849-4.84-1.041gourmatche
-2.71-1.2051.620.4630.660.191touareg
-1.34-0.304-0.66-0.144-1.05-0.247other
Village characteristics
1.130.0081.790.0151.830.016number of wells
0.890.3953.411.1904.151.355ethnic fractionalization index
-0.06-0.015-0.37-0.071-0.20-0.038market in village
-2.83-1.343-1.23-0.882-1.67-1.068electricity in village
1.060.1980.740.1220.630.095village accessible in rainy season
2.090.2833.690.3653.610.359log(# RPOs/# village inhabitants)
1.280.1923.580.4633.970.516log(average household size)
-0.41-0.0650.510.081-0.10-0.015log(number of RPOs in village)
-0.58-0.4890.400.2660.120.076Intercept
107721077210772Number of observations
239239239Number of villages
0.0780.0980.112Pseudo R-squared
Test of membership correlation within households
0.2500.4801.380chi-square
0.6160.4880.240p-value
all z stat. based on robust standard errors corrected for village clustering
Table 4B. Determinants of RPO membership – Senegal
Female hh membersMale hh membersAny hh member
robustrobustrobust
z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.Household characteristics
5.100.5820.780.0835.420.754log(number of household members)
-6.03-0.9982.060.523-0.64-0.142female head dummy
1.610.005-2.51-0.008-0.38-0.001age of head
0.580.017-1.43-0.0420.000.000education level of head
0.850.0670.490.0471.320.152family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
3.260.3841.340.1943.150.436log(owned land +1)
-0.97-0.111-0.04-0.004-1.31-0.183log(nber of donkeys+1)
-1.84-0.1470.680.052-1.63-0.157log(nber of cows+1)
1.120.0853.180.2231.530.155log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
0.660.060-1.58-0.128-0.01-0.001economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
Ethnicity (Wolof is omitted category)
-3.35-0.995-4.43-1.631-2.73-1.054serere
0.910.3161.330.4952.381.167toucouleur
-1.62-0.542-2.93-1.047-1.68-0.664peuhl
-1.07-0.322-0.17-0.076-1.31-0.538other
Village characteristics
0.760.0220.850.0231.170.045number of wells
-2.76-1.998-0.14-0.111-1.54-1.267ethnic fractionalization index
-0.64-0.184-0.45-0.134-0.23-0.094market in village
-0.27-0.0921.430.5230.060.027electricity in village
-1.45-0.430-1.04-0.355-1.15-0.445village accessible in rainy season
0.800.1601.880.3641.510.416log(# RPOs/# village inhabitants)
1.760.4870.990.3031.140.336log(average household size)
-2.35-0.4752.480.600-2.47-0.586log(number of RPOs in village)
0.290.3321.011.2871.592.583Intercept
716271627162Number of observations
194194194Number of villages
0.1340.1720.154Pseudo R-squared
Test of membership correlation within households
1.5100.0300.060chi-square
0.2200.8630.803p-value
all z stat. based on robust standard errors corrected for village clustering
Table 5A. RPO membership controlling for village fixed effects – Burkina Faso
Female hh membersMale hh membersAny hh member
robustrobustrobust
z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.Household characteristics
11.220.6299.350.48912.380.654log(number of household members)
-5.12-1.060-4.34-0.783-2.97-0.508female head dummy
-1.90-0.003-9.51-0.017-6.59-0.011age of head
-0.34-0.0090.010.000-0.17-0.004education level of head
8.100.30910.910.39911.970.445family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
2.040.1165.000.2554.710.247log(owned land +1)
0.450.0311.110.0712.120.140log(nber of donkeys+1)
-0.51-0.019-0.20-0.007-1.28-0.047log(nber of cows+1)
3.000.0943.450.0993.310.096log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
2.970.1084.810.1664.790.172economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
Ethnicity (Mossi is omitted category)
-3.54-0.703-5.83-0.998-6.41-1.133peuhl
0.670.2902.721.0631.830.676gourounsi
2.031.4650.700.5201.611.188bissa
5.041.5542.650.7733.461.011gourmatche
-3.18-1.478-3.06-1.008-3.40-1.129touareg
1.540.294-0.35-0.054-0.16-0.028other
9295100849909Number of observations
204220212Number of villages
101010Minimum obs per village
45.645.846.7Average obs per village
264264264Maximum obs. per village
Table 5B. RPO membership controlling for village fixed effects – Senegal
Female hh membersMale hh membersAny hh member
robustrobustrobust
z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.z stat.Coef.Household characteristics
10.550.8184.920.40611.301.079log(number of household members)
-9.02-1.1978.221.2952.170.364female head dummy
1.870.005-2.55-0.007-0.71-0.002age of head
-0.40-0.0101.720.0480.850.025education level of head
1.340.0722.950.1602.480.160family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
3.640.3194.990.4414.940.500log(owned land +1)
1.950.1751.730.1571.850.205log(nber of donkeys+1)
-1.92-0.112-0.15-0.008-1.93-0.135log(nber of cows+1)
1.930.0852.490.1152.050.112log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
0.510.029-0.04-0.003-0.02-0.001economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
Ethnicity (Wolof is omitted category)
-0.07-0.024-2.01-0.6921.110.428serere
-2.57-0.959-2.02-0.638-2.00-0.857toucouleur
-3.55-0.837-5.13-1.259-3.95-1.127peuhl
-2.64-0.667-1.72-0.446-2.52-0.754other
602054664597Number of observations
150137109Number of villages
879Minimum obs per village
40.139.942.2Average obs per village
111111111Maximum obs. per village
Table 6. Descriptive statistics on paired data
SenegalBurkina Faso
St.dev.MeanSt.dev.MeanGroup membership
67.6%29.8%% households in same RPO
32.5%22.4%% with at least one male in same RPO
54.7%13.0%% with at least one female in same RPO
0.891.020.610.37number of common RPOs for household
0.590.380.430.23number of common RPOs for males
0.620.620.340.13number of common RPOs for females
Distance
8.029.376.549.37Physical distance
0.300.900.340.86Same ethnicity dummy
Absolute difference in household characteristics
0.480.580.500.63log(number of household members)
0.340.140.200.04female head dummy
12.0115.4913.4417.02age of head
1.730.971.240.57education level of head
0.830.740.880.98economic status (1=poor to 4=rich)
0.830.590.810.56family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
0.490.420.570.52log(owned land +1)
0.510.400.480.39log(nber of donkeys+1)
0.910.600.950.87log(nber of cows+1)
0.960.980.981.12log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Sum of household characteristics
0.914.280.923.63log(number of household members)
0.410.170.210.04female head dummy
21.46101.5123.3688.51age of head
2.191.531.440.68education level of head
1.393.951.454.14economic status (rank 1 to 4)
1.471.591.631.52family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
1.231.941.042.25log(owned land +1)
1.561.300.760.68log(nber of donkeys+1)
1.410.901.561.57log(nber of cows+1)
1.922.531.862.91log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Village characteristics
3.122.327.683.68number of wells
0.170.110.240.22ethnic fractionalization index
0.470.330.460.31market in village
0.450.290.170.03electricity in village
0.480.660.500.47village accessible in rainy season
0.73-5.840.83-5.95log(# RPOs/# village inhabitants)
0.352.190.542.11log(average household size)
0.650.880.771.01log(number of RPOs in village)
359470698906Number of observations
Table 7A. Dyadic logit regressions – Burkina Faso
Female member is in a RPOMale member is in a RPOAny member is in a RPO
vill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadic
robustrobustrobustrobustrobustrobust
z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.Distance
-4.72-11.25-0.053-4.92-12.76-0.050-5.42-10.41-0.050Physical distance
2.788.071.2332.667.570.7733.035.400.852Same ethnicity dummy
Difference in household characteristics
-1.24-1.47-0.080-2.33-2.89-0.121-1.93-1.61-0.095log(number of household members)
1.742.100.223-3.74-3.82-1.259-0.68-0.86-0.126female head dummy
-2.46-4.18-0.008-2.06-2.99-0.004-2.94-2.82-0.006age of head
-1.44-1.73-0.0430.030.030.001-0.25-0.21-0.005education level of head
-1.17-1.88-0.051-0.32-0.70-0.014-0.64-0.94-0.026economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
-0.68-1.97-0.080-1.37-3.61-0.114-1.77-2.63-0.135family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
0.440.940.0462.515.530.2071.862.950.151log(owned land +1)
-1.04-1.63-0.099-1.08-1.68-0.067-1.58-1.80-0.100log(nber of donkeys+1)
-0.92-1.23-0.033-1.44-2.42-0.062-1.69-2.11-0.066log(nber of cows+1)
1.472.150.050-1.36-1.75-0.033-1.13-1.12-0.028log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Sum of household characteristics
1.853.260.1661.513.250.1402.643.800.223log(number of household members)
-1.73-1.39-0.340-1.18-1.58-0.376-0.32-0.42-0.072female head dummy
2.162.940.005-2.23-2.99-0.004-0.42-0.40-0.001age of head
0.570.710.026-1.14-1.44-0.034-0.66-0.54-0.020education level of head
1.102.190.0770.320.720.0200.641.020.039economic status (rank 1 to 4)
3.249.400.2322.337.150.1492.684.380.155family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
1.453.030.1260.621.360.0452.073.250.153log(owned land +1)
-0.70-1.13-0.0640.691.400.0630.881.300.079log(nber of donkeys+1)
0.851.400.0401.122.530.0710.751.160.043log(nber of cows+1)
-0.47-0.92-0.023-0.50-1.02-0.019-0.80-1.25-0.031log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Village characteristics
0.040.100.0011.303.400.0151.232.710.015number of wells
1.694.911.1172.578.021.3342.775.361.399ethnic fractionalization index
1.033.020.3861.113.490.3361.232.510.375market in village
-2.67-4.92-1.667-1.91-6.09-1.519-2.57-6.31-1.503electricity in village
0.912.780.2910.531.640.1240.601.320.141village accessible in rainy season
4.4011.950.8594.4311.880.7055.3310.250.861log(# RPOs/# village inhabitants)
1.554.510.4442.617.710.5053.186.750.685log(average household size)
-2.81-7.84-0.626-1.67-5.58-0.426-2.37-5.88-0.560log(number of RPOs in village)
-0.09-0.21-0.0981.162.891.1571.272.541.289Intercept
0.1270.1010.121Pseudo R-squared
681786681786681786Number of observations
241241241Number of villages
Table 7B. Dyadic logit regressions – Senegal
Female member is in a RPOMale member is in a RPOAny member is in a RPO
vill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadic
robustrobustrobustrobustrobustrobust
z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.Distance
-1.13-1.98-0.008-0.57-0.87-0.004-0.76-0.70-0.007Physical distance
0.290.370.0520.040.060.0080.490.410.096Same ethnicity dummy
Difference in household characteristics
-3.32-3.24-0.216-2.14-2.21-0.155-3.04-1.75-0.218log(number of household members)
-2.36-1.97-0.264-3.88-3.29-0.5110.280.130.021female head dummy
2.242.200.0051.742.140.0051.731.020.005age of head
-2.22-2.86-0.078-0.99-1.44-0.036-2.10-2.04-0.090education level of head
1.532.470.100-0.08-0.17-0.0070.460.530.040economic status (1=poor to 4=rich)
1.382.170.0790.611.050.0421.231.200.083family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
-2.13-2.95-0.217-2.24-3.06-0.238-3.07-2.61-0.357log(owned land +1)
-0.41-0.36-0.024-0.36-0.41-0.031-0.45-0.24-0.034log(nber of donkeys+1)
-0.44-0.56-0.0212.144.500.1830.900.740.048log(nber of cows+1)
-1.74-1.78-0.059-1.35-2.07-0.066-1.83-1.09-0.067log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Sum of household characteristics
3.134.570.252-0.43-0.78-0.0472.192.190.239log(number of household members)
-2.68-3.29-0.548-0.20-0.23-0.040-1.80-1.55-0.352female head dummy
0.040.040.000-1.75-2.21-0.005-0.69-0.46-0.002age of head
1.001.270.036-0.57-0.84-0.0220.340.280.014education level of head
-0.30-0.45-0.018-1.09-2.13-0.088-0.76-0.76-0.063economic status (rank 1 to 4)
0.971.350.0540.641.070.0491.170.990.076family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
3.215.930.2682.435.940.3062.632.670.284log(owned land +1)
0.180.390.014-0.41-1.02-0.0380.070.090.007log(nber of donkeys+1)
-1.70-2.38-0.104-1.80-3.90-0.173-1.81-1.50-0.125log(nber of cows+1)
2.784.860.1423.377.130.2192.352.630.171log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Village characteristics
1.452.730.0600.481.260.0211.141.500.061number of wells
-2.51-4.80-1.873-0.31-0.79-0.277-0.95-1.22-0.915ethnic fractionalization index
1.292.800.4261.192.900.4551.301.730.594market in village
-0.46-1.22-0.1761.945.220.8660.400.710.210electricity in village
-1.92-3.42-0.565-2.31-5.35-1.067-1.91-1.75-0.801village accessible in rainy season
0.030.080.0061.212.270.2810.650.810.190log(# RPOs/# village inhabitants)
1.312.500.3860.491.080.2160.420.430.163log(average household size)
-4.01-11.16-1.050-0.09-0.27-0.027-3.55-6.25-1.254log(number of RPOs in village)
-0.70-1.57-0.9330.601.370.9440.891.211.675Intercept
350274350274350274Number of observations
196196196Number of villages
Table 8A. Dyadic village fixed effect regressions – Burkina Faso
# RPOs of female hh mbers.# RPOs of male hh members# RPOs to which hh belongsA. Burkina Faso
vill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadic
robustrobustrobustrobustrobustrobust
z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.Distance
-5.40-7.23-0.003-4.85-7.96-0.004-6.40-8.75-0.006Physical distance
2.497.320.1004.1710.630.1513.5710.250.264Same ethnicity dummy
Difference in household characteristics
-2.96-3.56-0.015-2.13-2.89-0.015-3.15-3.96-0.030log(number of household members)
-0.56-0.83-0.009-4.03-4.88-0.125-2.55-3.35-0.073female head dummy
-1.93-2.52-0.000-1.53-2.21-0.000-1.97-2.86-0.001age of head
-0.64-0.47-0.001-1.12-1.11-0.003-1.31-1.22-0.004education level of head
-1.87-2.43-0.005-1.19-3.12-0.008-1.11-2.33-0.008economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
-1.83-6.29-0.024-1.76-5.22-0.023-1.81-6.28-0.045family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
-0.01-0.01-0.0000.320.520.002-0.20-0.31-0.002log(owned land +1)
0.140.140.0010.370.500.0020.150.170.001log(nber of donkeys+1)
-1.24-1.65-0.004-1.36-2.45-0.008-1.63-2.36-0.010log(nber of cows+1)
-1.58-1.88-0.003-2.62-3.31-0.008-2.93-3.85-0.014log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Sum of household characteristics
4.898.030.0323.295.850.0284.708.210.058log(number of household members)
-1.75-2.23-0.041-1.63-2.65-0.095-2.22-3.67-0.124female head dummy
-1.17-1.95-0.000-3.52-5.78-0.001-2.94-4.94-0.001age of head
1.040.780.0020.480.480.0010.990.860.004education level of head
1.671.690.0051.713.460.0121.252.270.012economic status (rank 1 to 4)
2.546.290.0243.137.650.0332.978.090.060family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
1.983.100.0122.463.110.0152.904.180.031log(owned land +1)
-0.63-0.76-0.004-0.26-0.34-0.0020.020.030.000log(nber of donkeys+1)
-0.26-0.29-0.0010.370.800.0030.350.570.003log(nber of cows+1)
1.412.010.0042.392.910.0082.193.280.014log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
-1.59-0.0720.320.014-0.77-0.056Intercept
683306683306683306Number of observations
243243243Number of villages
Table 8B. Dyadic village fixed effect regressions – Senegal
# RPOs of female hh mbers.# RPOs of male hh members# RPOs to which hh belongs
vill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadicvill.clust.dyadic
robustrobustrobustrobustrobustrobust
z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.z stat.z stat.Coef.Distance
-1.65-3.58-0.002-1.46-1.86-0.001-1.97-3.45-0.002Physical distance
2.563.280.0692.483.270.0592.503.500.108Same ethnicity dummy
Difference in household characteristics
-4.02-4.35-0.036-2.67-3.07-0.023-4.35-4.92-0.052log(number of household members)
-3.93-5.33-0.078-3.93-7.98-0.175-3.14-4.66-0.059female head dummy
0.530.630.000-0.31-0.33-0.000-1.03-1.04-0.000age of head
-2.56-2.51-0.008-2.78-2.94-0.007-3.01-3.36-0.013education level of head
-0.22-0.29-0.001-0.75-0.96-0.004-0.32-0.37-0.002economic status (from 1=poor to 4=rich)
0.060.090.000-0.46-0.55-0.002-0.49-0.80-0.003family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
-1.51-1.72-0.015-1.71-2.04-0.016-2.25-2.99-0.036log(owned land +1)
-2.59-2.66-0.026-3.26-2.96-0.026-2.88-2.88-0.039log(nber of donkeys+1)
0.821.180.0050.630.740.0020.901.270.006log(nber of cows+1)
-1.90-2.44-0.009-2.62-2.74-0.009-2.40-2.97-0.014log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
Sum of household characteristics
-2.72-4.90-0.0781.603.240.068-1.06-1.57-0.025female head dummy
0.520.600.000-2.10-2.37-0.001-0.98-0.97-0.000age of head
-0.03-0.03-0.0001.030.960.0020.800.780.003education level of head
0.550.740.0040.761.020.0041.191.530.009economic status (rank 1 to 4)
0.951.230.0060.480.780.0030.891.560.009family ties with authorities (index 0 to 4)
7.219.550.0722.973.440.0236.198.980.086log(number of household members)
2.143.180.0263.365.050.0373.265.640.063log(owned land +1)
1.341.400.0131.121.210.0101.341.560.020log(nber of donkeys+1)
-1.49-2.13-0.012-0.65-0.73-0.003-1.49-2.05-0.014log(nber of cows+1)
0.921.100.0040.660.790.0030.721.070.005log(nber of goat and sheep+1)
3.160.2254.750.2355.180.508Intercept
350274350274350274Number of observations
196196196Number of villages


